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Abstract
In this paper we study the extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) could
have contributed to recent increase in wages in China. Using a World Bank survey
data set of 1500 Chinese enterprises conducted in 2002, we ﬁnd that the presence of
FDI has both direct and indirect eﬀects on wages of skilled workers, while it does not
appear to aﬀect wages of production workers. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the indirect eﬀect
of the FDI presence on wages of skilled workers is limited to private ﬁrms. We further
ﬁnd that observed quality of skilled workers in state owned enterprises (SOEs) declines
in the presence of FDI in the same industry and region. We discuss potential reasons
for such discrepancy in the FDI eﬀects on private ﬁrms’ and SOEs’ labor practices.
These ﬁndings highlight the relevance of labor market institutions in determining FDI
spillovers.
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11 Introduction
Both researchers and policy-makers have long touted foreign direct investment (FDI) as an
important factor in promoting developing countries’ economic growth. However, despite the
rapid growth in international capital ﬂows in recent decades, there is no consensus regarding
the impact of FDI inﬂows on domestic ﬁrms.1 As a result, it is still unclear whether the
appropriate government policy is to promote FDI inﬂows, to restrict them, or to adopt a
laissez–faire stance towards them.
One of the reasons that have been cited to explain the failure in ﬁnding positive FDI spillovers
is the competition eﬀects on domestic ﬁrms. Aitken and Harrison (1999), for example,
document competition eﬀects in the output market: by competing away market share from
domestic ﬁrms, foreign ﬁrms are believed to impose negative eﬀects on indigenous ﬁrms
in the host country, which may oﬀset the positive technological spillovers transferred from
foreign ﬁrms to domestic ﬁrms. In this paper, we focus instead on competition eﬀects in the
input markets. In particular, foreign ﬁrms may compete for labor inputs with indigenous
ﬁrms on the domestic labor market and drive up the wage bill.
As shown on Figure 1, in China both real FDI capital utilization and real average wage
showed an upward trend in the last decade. Of course, the patterns shown in the ﬁgure
could be due to a multiplicity of changes that have simultaneously occurred in China during
the same time period. A more rigorous study showing the competition eﬀects of FDI on
domestic labor market requires more disaggregated data. To date, there has been little
direct evidence supporting such competition eﬀects on labor markets: While there has been
mixed evidence about the direct eﬀect of FDI on wages, i.e. tests of whether foreign invested
ﬁrms pay higher wages,2 to our knowledge there has been little analysis of indirect eﬀects of
1For a critical evaluation of studies that ﬁnd no or negative FDI spillovers, see Moran (2007).
2Literature on wages in foreign–invested enterprises includes Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) study
that ﬁnds that higher FDI is associated with higher wages in foreign–invested ﬁrms; Almeida (2007) and
Heyman, Sj¨ oholm, and Tingvall (2007) studies that ﬁnd no eﬀects for Sweden and Portugal, respectively;
Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wrights (2002) and Girma and G¨ org (2007) studies that ﬁnd some positive
2Figure 1: FDI capital utilization and average wages in China
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FDI on wages in domestic ﬁrms.3 We found no studies of FDI eﬀect on quality of labor in
foreign invested and domestic ﬁrm.
To ﬁll this gap, in this paper we study both direct and indirect eﬀects of FDI presence
on labor market outcomes in China using the World Bank ﬁrm survey data. We analyze
the pressure that FDI puts on wages and quality composition of labor. We measure direct
eﬀects by analyzing diﬀerences between foreign invested and domestic ﬁrms. We measure
indirect eﬀects by studying the eﬀects of FDI presence in the same city and industry on
wages and quality of labor in domestic ﬁrms. To control for potential endogeneity of FDI,
we use instrumental; variables approach.
There are two aspects of Chinese labor market that we need to take into account when
analyzing our data and interpreting our results. First, although China, until recently, had
a rich endowment of unskilled labor, the shortage of skilled labor is well documented. For
eﬀects in for unskilled wages in the UK; and Lipsey and Sj¨ oholm (2004) study for Indonesia that ﬁnds
positive eﬀects of FDI on wages. In a related paper, Braconier, Norback, and Urban (2005) study the role
of low labor costs is attracting FDI.
3Exceptions are Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) study of U.S., Mexican, and Venezuelan ﬁrms that
ﬁnd no evidence of wage spillovers, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) study of Mexican regions that ﬁnd positive
spillovers of FDI on skilled wages, and Barry, G¨ org, and Strobl (2005) study of large Irish ﬁrms that ﬁnd
diﬀerential eﬀects on exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms.
3example, according to the Report on Chinese Entrepreneurs issued by the Survey System
for Chinese Entrepreneurs in 2003, 80% of the entrepreneurs surveyed report a shortage of
technical personnel, over 50% report a shortage of managerial personnel, and 74% report a
shortage of sales personnel. Second, personnel practices in state owned enterprises (SOEs)
in China are likely to diﬀer dramatically from those in private ﬁrms. To account for these
two aspects, we study eﬀects on wages and quality of skilled and unskilled labor separately.
We also allow for FDI presence to have a diﬀerent eﬀect on wages and quality of labor in
domestic SOEs and private ﬁrms.
Broadly speaking, we ﬁnd that some of the increase in wages in China could indeed be
attributed to FDI. However, the competitive pressure from FDI does not aﬀect all types
of labor in the same way. In addition, FDI presence aﬀects wages and quality of labor
diﬀerently in domestically owned private ﬁrms and in SOEs. In particular, we don’t ﬁnd
direct or indirect eﬀects of FDI on the market for unskilled labor — foreign invested ﬁrms
do not pay higher wage to production workers than domestic ﬁrms, hire workers of the same
observed quality, and FDI presence does not seem to have any eﬀect on wages and quality
of production workers in domestic ﬁrms. In contrast, we ﬁnd that foreign invested ﬁrms pay
higher wages to their skilled workers and that the observed quality of skilled workers is higher
in foreign invested ﬁrms, compared to domestic ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that larger presence of
FDI leads to higher wages of skilled workers in private ﬁrms and to lower quality of skilled
workers in SOEs, especially relative to private ﬁrms. These results are more consistent with
labor market competition eﬀects of FDI than with skill–biased technology transfer, a ﬁnding
similar to that of Zhao (2001).
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we use a unique ﬁrm–level data set to
study the eﬀects of FDI in China, an issue that caught the attention of the literature and the
media because of China’s record–setting growth and FDI inﬂows.4 Second, the contrasting
outcomes we ﬁnd for SOEs and for private ﬁrms add evidence to the advantages of private
4For a review of previous studies on FDI spillovers in China, see Hale and Long (2007).
4ownership over state ownership documented in previous studies.5 Third, our empirical ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the inability of SOEs to beneﬁt from FDI technological spillovers may be
due to the wage constraints that forbid them from hiring high quality skilled labor. To
the extent that labor market institutions are restrictive in many developing countries, our
ﬁndings suggest an explanation for the fact that positive FDI spillovers are more diﬃcult to
ﬁnd in developing countries. Finally, because skilled labor enjoys higher wages and we ﬁnd
positive eﬀects of FDI on wages of skilled workers, our ﬁndings speak to the literature on
FDI and wage inequality.6
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides institutional background on FDI
and wage policies in China and outlines the implications of wage restrictions on SOEs when
they compete with other types of ﬁrms in the labor market. Section 3 describes the data
and the methodology, and presents the empirical ﬁndings. Section 4 discusses the various
interpretations of our ﬁndings, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Implications
In this section we describe the institutional environment in China that is relevant to our
analysis — FDI–related policies and trends as well as diﬀerences between private ﬁrms’ and
SOEs’ wage and personnel policies.
2.1 Foreign direct investment and FDI policies in China
China’s FDI policies developed from being restrictive before 1978 to being permissive in
the early 1980s, then to being encouraging in the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, and ﬁnally
5See Megginson and Netter (2001) for a summary of empirical evidence showing superior performance of
private ﬁrms over SOEs.
6Two closely related paper in this respect are Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) which, in contrast to our
ﬁndings, ﬁnds no increase in demand for skilled labor due to inward FDI into the U.S., and Feenstra and
Hanson (1997) that do ﬁnd an increase in demand for skilled labor due to FDI inﬂows into Mexico.
5matured in the mid-1990s to link FDI to domestic development priorities. With the country’s
accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, substantial changes were made
to its FDI policies largely to unify the treatment of domestic and foreign ﬁrms.7
Since the beginning of the reform era in the mid-1980s, when FDI was allowed only in
a limited number of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), the geographic scope was gradually
expanded to cover more coastal cities and regions, and then ﬁnally to cover the whole country
by the mid-1990s. Along with the expansion of geographic areas open to FDI, government
policies toward FDI also evolved from permitting it to encouraging it through favorable
treatment in taxes, tariﬀs, foreign exchange regulations, and licensing requirements. These
early measures, largely embodied in the Provisions of the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment (1986), prompted the rapid
growth in FDI inﬂow into China, especially between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s.
Illustrating the breathtaking speed of FDI growth in China, the annual FDI inﬂow was $100
million in 1979, $1 billion in 1984, and then reached close to $40 billion in 1995. As shown
in Figure 1, the annual FDI inﬂow has remained above $40 billion since 1995, while the
FDI/GDP ratio has surpassed 3% since 1992. Between 1994 and 1997, the ratio exceeded
5%.8
Due to the limited geographic regions open to foreign capital and favorable tax policies in the
early stages of China’s opening up, FDI was largely concentrated in coastal areas and labor
intensive industries. Since the mid-1990s, in addition to further expanding the geographic
regions open to foreign investment and maintaining a favorable investment environment,
government policies began to focus more on linking FDI to domestic development priorities.
For instance, the Provisional Guidelines for Foreign Investment Projects, which took eﬀect
in 1995, classiﬁed all FDI projects to one of four categories: encouraged, restricted, prohib-
7See Fung, Iizaka, and Tong (2004) for a detailed review of the trend, policy, and impact of FDI in China.
8Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2004) show that the investment climate in China is superior
to that of South Asian or Latin American countries and that this advantage helps explain large FDI inﬂows
into China.
6Figure 2: FDI inﬂows into China
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3 0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
FDI inflow (billion u.s. dollars)
FDI/GDP (right axis)
Source: Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Chinese National Bureau of Statistics)
ited, and permitted. Priority was given to FDI in the agriculture, energy, transportation,
telecommunications, basic raw materials, and high-technology industries. FDI projects that
could take advantage of the rich natural resources and relatively low labor costs in the central
and northwest regions were also vigorously encouraged.9 As a result, investment from large
multinational corporations has increased rapidly and FDI started to shift toward capital–
and technology–intensive industries since the mid-1990s. While the coastal areas continue to
attract the most FDI inﬂows, certain inland regions have also become more popular among
foreign investors.
In spite of China’s great success in attracting FDI, the eﬀects of FDI on domestic ﬁrms are
far from clear. For instance, Huang (2003) argues that the large FDI inﬂow into China is
accompanied by the repressive policies toward domestic private ﬁrms, implying that foreign
ﬁrms have captured resources, markets, and policy preferences from domestic ﬁrms. From
9The new Guiding Catalogue of Foreign Investment Projects published in 2002 further combined the
categories into three: encouraged, prohibited, and permitted.
7the viewpoint of the government, the goal in encouraging FDI has been clearly stated from
the very beginning to be obtaining advanced technology as well as management skills from
foreign partners. But the government’s early reluctance to allow solely foreign–owned ﬁrms
(till the passage in 1986 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprises Operated
Exclusively with Foreign Capital) suggests that it had doubts about FDI spillover eﬀects on
domestic ﬁrms. In addition, restrictions on domestic sales of foreign–invested ﬁrms that
existed during much of the pre-WTO period seem to reﬂect the government’s concern that
foreign ﬁrms might crowd out domestic ﬁrms in their competition for domestic market share.
In addition to the potential competition eﬀects on the output market, FDI inﬂows may also
pose competitions to domestic ﬁrms on the input markets, especially on the labor markets.
The latter competition eﬀects probably did not enter the decision-makers’ minds at the
time. But our results to be presented below suggest that such competition eﬀects are quite
important and thus deserve more consideration in the future.
2.2 Firm ownership and personnel practices in China
A ﬁrm’s ownership type has important eﬀects on employee salaries in China. Liu, Long, and
Jing (2007) show that on average, salaries are higher in state owned enterprises (SOEs) than
in domestic private ﬁrms even after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics (such as ﬁrm size, age,
capital intensity, existence of union, sector and region) as well as employee characteristics
(such as education, age, gender, labor productivity, technical level and working experience).
However, a typical manager or engineer is paid more in private ﬁrms than in SOEs (Kato and
Long, 2006). Combined, these patterns imply greater salary dispersion in domestic private
ﬁrms than in SOEs. In other words, the pay schedule is more compressed in SOEs.10.
There are at least two potential explanations for such diﬀerences, both legacies of the planned
economy before 1978: (1) SOEs face constraints in their wage structures, i.e., they cannot
10 Our World Bank data set shows the same patterns, i.e., greater salary dispersion in private ﬁrms than
in SOEs
8pay their skilled employees more due to constraints imposed through government policies
and guidelines; and, (2) SOEs have multiple social objectives and thus are not willing to
structure their wage scales at the cost of egalitarianism.
Before economic reforms began in the late 1970s, employee compensation in China followed
a rigid grid system based on factors that reﬂected neither ﬁrm performance nor individual
contributions. The bulk of the industrial labor force was employed in SOEs and their com-
pensation was determined by the region, industry, level of supervising government agency,
and the size of the enterprise, as well as the job title, occupation, and seniority of the
individual.
In the post-reform era, compensation mechanisms in SOEs oftentimes are still subject to
government guidelines that restrict wage diﬀerentials among employees and that often set
a limit on the maximum salary for executives. For example, both the central government
and several provincial governments in China have set or are considering setting limits on the
ratio between CEO salary and production worker compensation. The current limit being
contemplated by the central government is 15, while provinces such as Jiangxi have recently
adopted 10 as the ratio limit.11
As a comparison, the 1996-1997 Tower Perrin Compensation Survey gives the range of CEO–
worker compensation ratio of 11 for Germany and 24 for the United States. To the extent that
these numbers reﬂect the eﬃcient outcomes of labor market competition in those countries
and given the fact that China most likely is in greater need for managerial talents, these
limits may impose artiﬁcial restrictions on SOEs’ ability to hire and retain talent.
Although schemes to circumvent salary caps abound, big salaries for top executives are
generally frowned upon by both the government and other employees in the state owned
ﬁrms. While private ﬁrms strive to increase ﬁrm value and thus base employee pay on
11See the March 25, 2005, Issue of China Industry and Commerce Times, and “The Rules for Adminis-
trating CEO Compensation in SOEs in Jiangxi Province,” government document issued by the Jiangxi State
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (accessed online on July 21, 2006 at
http : //jiangxi.jxnews.com.cn/system/2006/07/07/002290697.shtml) .
9individual productivity, state owned ﬁrms have multiple social objectives to achieve, some
of which (such as social stability) are more congruent with more equal pay schemes.
In contrast, private ﬁrms in China have always enjoyed more freedom in setting their own
compensation policies and they show great ﬂexibility in adopting more eﬀective incentive
systems. One telling example is the diﬀerent pace at which diﬀerent ﬁrms adopt the “yearly
salary system” for executive compensation. Consisting of a ﬁxed component (the base salary)
and a variable component (the risk salary) that relates the executive’s salary to ﬁrm perfor-
mance, this new system resembles the typical cash compensation package in Western ﬁrms.
The mechanism was initially conceived by the central government as a way to improve SOE
performance. In reality, however, the new compensation system was adopted by private
ﬁrms at a much faster pace, once it proved to provide an eﬀective incentive mechanism for
executives.12 Even in SOEs that have adopted the new compensation system for executives,
there is more emphasis on egalitarian concerns.
These explicit and implicit constraints imply a more compressed wage structure in SOEs.
As recently as 1999, the highest ratio between CEO compensation and that of an average
production worker was 6 among the 40 largest enterprises owned by the central government.13
We are not aware of any data on the ratio between CEO salary and production worker
compensation for private Chinese ﬁrms in general. But compensation data for private listed
ﬁrms in China and worker compensation data from the International Labor Organization
suggest that the ratio was close to 15 between 1998 and 2002.
Whether it is the inability or the unwillingness on the part of the SOEs, the discussion above
shows that in reality private ﬁrms in China tend to have a more dispersed and more ﬂexible
wage distribution. Whether the more rigid and compressed wage structure in Chinese SOEs
is due to explicit restrictions or implicit limitations, they have similar implications on how
12See Kato and Long (2006) for a detailed discussion of executive salary policies in Chinese ﬁrms.
13See the “Research report on Chinese manager incentive mechanisms and policies,” cited in the Jan. 14,
2002, issue of the Market Daily (accessed online on July 26, 2006 at
http : //news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002 − 01/24/content252489.htm) .
10these ﬁrms compete on the labor market. When faced with ﬁrms that are both willing and
able to pay higher wages for workers of higher quality, SOEs may experience diﬃculty in
attracting and retaining quality employees. We now explore the empirical validity of this
implication.
3 Empirical evidence
In this section we will show our ﬁndings with respect to the eﬀects of FDI on labor market
competition in China. We realize that our ﬁndings could have multiple interpretations which
we will discuss in the next section. First, we describe our data.
3.1 Data
We use data from the Study of Competitiveness, Technology and Firm Linkages conducted
by the World Bank in 2001 described in more detail in Hale and Long (2007). The survey
consists of two questionnaires, one ﬁlled out by the Senior Manager of the ﬁrm’s main pro-
duction facility, and the other ﬁlled out by the accountant and/or the personnel manager of
the ﬁrm. The survey collects detailed information on ﬁrms and their operation environment.
For most of the variables, the ﬁrms were requested to provide information as of year 2000.
However, for many accounting measures, information from up to three previous years was
also collected. In this study, we use a small portion of the survey that gives accounting infor-
mation on ﬁrms’ input (including wages and the composition of the labor force), output, and
ownership structure. The list of variables used in our study is presented in the Appendix.
The methodology of the survey is stratiﬁed random sampling with the stratiﬁcation based
on subsectors including accounting and related services, advertising and marketing, apparel
and leather goods, business logistics services, communication services, consumer products,
electronic equipment and components, information technology (IT), and auto parts. A strat-
11iﬁed random sample of 300 establishments is drawn from each of ﬁve cities in China: Beijing,
Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin, giving a total sample size of 1500. Table 1
gives the city and sector distribution of ﬁrms included in the survey.14
Based on the information on ﬁrms’ foreign ownership, we construct the measure of FDI
presence as follows: For each domestic ﬁrm, we identify the city–sector cell where the ﬁrm is
located. We then compute the weighted average of the largest foreign partner’s share in each
ﬁrm located in the same city–sector, as of 1999, with ﬁrm employment as the weight. The
average foreign share thus obtained is referred to as the “FDI presence” in the city–sector
cell. Our focus, therefore, is the eﬀect of FDI presence within the same geographic location
and industry. Table 2 gives the average foreign share by city and industry sector. For the
part of the analysis where we study FDI spillovers in the same location but possibly across
diﬀerent industries, the same method is used to compute average foreign share for each city,
also presented in Table 2.
Table 3 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Domestic ﬁrms with
private ownership of less than 20% are listed as SOEs, while others are listed as private.15
This split is only done for the purpose of comparing our variables for domestic ﬁrms with
diﬀerent ownership, while in the regression analysis that follows, we use a continuous measure
of the share of private ownership. The table shows that SOEs are quite diﬀerent from private
ﬁrms in many aspects: They tend to be larger and have a longer history; their workers tend
to be older and less educated, and tend to get lower wages; and their managers tend to have
less foreign work experience. These diﬀerences are all statistically signiﬁcant.
3.2 Empirical approach
First we analyze direct eﬀect of FDI on wages and labor quality by estimating diﬀerences
between domestic and foreign ﬁrms, excluding SOEs from our sample, where SOEs are
14For a detailed description of the survey, see Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten, and Xu (2003).
15This split corresponds most closely to the ownership characterizations provided by the ﬁrms.
12deﬁned as ﬁrms with less than 100 percent of private ownership share. We use a similar
speciﬁcation:
Yjik = αik + β1FORjik + Z
0
jik Γ + jik, (1)
where Yjik is an outcome variable, such as average production worker education, age, or
wage, in the ﬁrm j operating in industry i and city k, αik are city–industry ﬁxed eﬀects,
FORjik is the share of foreign ownership in ﬁrm j that operates in industry i and city k,
Zjik is a set of ﬁrm–level control variables speciﬁc to the outcome variable, while jik is a
robust error term. The coeﬃcient β2 on FORjik measures the diﬀerence between foreign and
domestic private ﬁrms and is thus the measure of direct eﬀect of foreign direct investment
on our outcome variables.
The above speciﬁcation, if estimated by the OLS, maybe subject to the omitted variable
bias, reﬂecting the “cherry–picking eﬀect” of foreign investment much discussed in the FDI
literature: the fact that foreign investors choose to acquire a stake in ﬁrms that are already
more productive. To address this potential bias, we estimate the same relationship using the
instrumental variables approach. Blonigen (2005) argues that multinational corporations
make overseas investment for several reasons, including securing access to domestic market,
and using cheap local resources, such as labor, to produce for other markets.16 After some
experimenting, we found two valid instruments in our data set that are correlated with share
of foreign ownership of the ﬁrm, but have no direct eﬀect on labor market outcomes for these
ﬁrms: the share of foreign sales (EXshare) of the ﬁrm and the share of transportation cost
in the total cost of purchasing supplies (TRcost). Both of these variables are available in
our survey data. Using these instruments, we estimate the following system of equations by
16Empirical studies demonstrating the importance of these factors include Amiti and Smarzynska Javorcik
(2008), Blomstrom and Lipsey (1991), and Kravis and Lipsey (1982) (size and access to domestic markets
and suppliers); Bagchi-Sen and Wheeler (1989) (population size, population growth, and per capita sales);
Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee (1991) (tax rate and infrastructure); de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) (tax
rate); Ma (2006) (access to international market). Studies on location of FDI speciﬁc to China include Cheng
and Kwanb (2000) and Sun, Tong, and Yu (2002).
13generalized method of moments (GMM).

 
 
FORjik = δik + δ1 EXsharejik + δ2 TRcostjik + Z0
jik Φ + ωjik
Yjik = α0
ik + β0
1FORjik + Z0
jik Γ + jik,
To document diﬀerences between SOEs and private ﬁrms, we restrict our analysis to ﬁrms
with no foreign partners, and use the following speciﬁcation:
Yjik = αik + β2PRjik + Z
0
jik Γ + jik, (2)
where PRjik is the share of private ownership of the ﬁrm j and other variables are the same
as deﬁned above. The coeﬃcient β2 on PRjik measures the diﬀerence between SOEs and
private ﬁrms.
Finally, to measure spillover eﬀects of FDI on domestic private ﬁrms and SOEs, we use the
following speciﬁcation, again limiting our sample to the ﬁrms with zero foreign ownership:
Yjik = αi + αk + β3FDIik + β4PRjik + β5FDIik · PRjik + Z
0
jik Γ + jik, (3)
where FDIik is a measure of FDI presence in industry i and city k and αi and αk are city
and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.17 The coeﬃcient β3 measures the eﬀect of FDI presence on ﬁrms
with zero private ownership, i.e. SOEs, while the sum β3 + β4 measure the eﬀect of FDI
presence on ﬁrms with 100 percent private ownership.
Like our test of the direct impact of foreign investment on labor market outcomes, this
test of the eﬀect of FDI presence on labor market outcomes in domestic ﬁrms is subject to
omitted variables bias, especially when the omitted variables aﬀect the FDI presence and
17Because our measure of FDI presence does not vary within city–industry cell, we cannot include a full
set of city–industry ﬁxed eﬀects, but rather include city and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
14the outcome variable in the same direction. Given that in this case our endogenous variable
is deﬁned at city–industry level, and is not ﬁrm speciﬁc, we need to ﬁnd instruments deﬁned
at the same level. Relying again on the ﬁndings related to determinants of FDI location
described above, we use the following two instruments for FDI, which are not correlated
with cost and quality of labor in domestic ﬁrms: the percentage of ﬁrms in the industry that
exported in year 2000 multiplied by the berth capacity of the city’s seaport (Port ∗ EX)
and the average transportation cost as a percentage of sales in the industry multiplied by
the sum of population of all other provinces weighted by the inverse of the distance between
the provincial capital and the city squared (Dist ∗ Tr).18
The capacity of the seaport aﬀects the cost of exporting, while the percentage of ﬁrms that
export serves as a proxy for the importance of exporting in a particular industry. Thus,
Port ∗ EX measures the access to overseas market and the attractiveness to FDI of the
particular city–industry cell. The sum of population of all other provinces weighted by the
square of the inverse of their distance to a city gives a measure of how centrally located the
city is, while the average transportation cost as a percentage of sales measures the bulkiness
of the industry. Dist ∗ Tr therefore measures the access to the domestic market and thus
the attractiveness to FDI of the city–industry. These two instruments vaguely correspond
to the ﬁrm–level export share and the transportation cost variables we used above.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate, using GMM, the following system:

        
        
FDIik = δi + δk + δ1 Port ∗ EXik + δ2 Dist ∗ Trik + Z0
ic Φ + ωik
FDIik · PRjik = ζi + ζk + (1 + ζ0 PRjik) · (ζ1 Port ∗ EXik + ζ2 Dist ∗ Trik)
+Z0
ic Ψ + $ik
Yjic = αi + αk + β0
3FDIik + β0
4PRjik + β0
5FDIik · PRjik + Z0
jik Γ + jik,
where Z0
ic is a matrix of ﬁrm characteristics, averaged for each city–industry cell.
18See Hale and Long (2007) for the full description and the values of these variables for each city–industry
cell.
153.3 Empirical results
Table 4 shows results of our study of direct eﬀects of FDI on wages and labor quality. We
exclude SOEs from our analysis to abstract from the diﬀerence in ownership.19 We ﬁnd that,
whether or not we control for observed quality of labor, ﬁrms with higher share of foreign
ownership share pay higher average wages to their engineers and managers. Part of the wage
premium is explained by the higher quality of managers, as the coeﬃcient on private share
is smaller once we control for observed quality, while the rest may be due to unobserved
variation in quality not controlled for by age and education. Although the point estimate is
positive, there is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of foreign ownership share on the wage of
production workers.
In addition, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher share of foreign ownership tend to hire younger
workers of all types, as well as more educated managers who are also more likely to have for-
eign working experience. Taking together, these results show that foreign invested ﬁrms seek
younger employees (note that we condition on the ﬁrm age), better qualiﬁed managers, and
are willing to pay higher wages to their engineers and managers, but not to their production
workers. Thus, higher presence of foreign–invested ﬁrms would raise the skilled wage level,
but not the unskilled wage.
The above eﬀects are substantial in terms of magnitude, ﬁrms with 100 percent foreign
ownership would hire engineers and production workers that are on average 2.3 years younger
and managers that on average 1.6 years younger, have 8.5 more months of education and are
12 percentage point more likely to have foreign experience, compared to domestic private
ﬁrms. Managers in fully foreign ﬁrms would get paid 51 percent more than in fully domestic
private ﬁrms, with 9 percentage points due to their observable quality advantage. Finally,
engineers in fully foreign ﬁrms get on average 30 percent higher wages compared to fully
domestic private ﬁrms.
19The reported results exclude all the domestic ﬁrms with private ownership share less than 100%. As a
robustness test we instead excluded ﬁrms according to their legal status and obtained similar results.
16Table 5 presents the results of the same set of regressions estimated with instrumental
variables by GMM. We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of foreign ownership on wages, employees age, and
managers’ foreign experience are qualitatively the same and are much larger in magnitude.
The only qualitative diﬀerence we ﬁnd is in the eﬀect of foreign ownership on education,
which is now negative for production workers and engineers and positive but not signiﬁcant
for managers. Moreover, the validity of our instruments is rejected in only two regressions:
those for engineers’ age and foreign experience, while the null of weak instruments is always
rejected. Overall, we believe that our OLS results discussed above are not driven by the
“cherry-picking” phenomenon, potentially with the exception of results related to employees’
education, and that foreign ownership is indeed associated with higher wages and better
quality of employees compared to the ﬁrms that are 100% domestically owned.
Before we discuss spillover eﬀects of FDI presence on wages and quality of labor in domestic
ﬁrms, we document diﬀerences in these variables for domestic ﬁrms with respect to their
ownership structure. Table 6 demonstrates that private ﬁrms tend to hire skilled labor of
higher quality and pay them higher wages. Speciﬁcally, if the share of private ownership is
higher, wages paid to engineers and managers, but not to production workers, are higher.
We also ﬁnd that employees of all types tend to be younger, the share of engineers and
managers with foreign experience larger, and the managers more educated, while production
workers tend to be less educated, if the private share is higher.
To discuss the magnitude of the above diﬀerences, we can compare ﬁrms with zero private
share with those that have 100 percent private ownership share. The coeﬃcients in the
regressions reported in Table 6 indicate that wages of engineers are higher in private ﬁrms
than in SOEs by about 17 percent, while the wages of managers are higher in private ﬁrms
by about 20 percent. Note that some wage diﬀerences are due to diﬀerences in quality
— when controlling for age, education, and foreign experience, the coeﬃcients on PRjik
in wage regressions for engineers and managers become smaller, with private ﬁrms paying
17wage by 12 and 15 percent higher for engineers and managers, respectively, than SOEs.20
In addition, private ﬁrms hire engineers and managers that are on average 2 and 4 years
younger, respectively, when we control for ﬁrm age. The diﬀerences in education level are
modest: private ﬁrms hire managers that on average have 4 additional months of education,
compared to SOEs.21 The average shares of engineers and managers with foreign experience
are 1 and 7 percentage points higher, respectively, in private ﬁrms than in SOEs.
We now turn to spillover eﬀects of foreign ﬁrm presence on domestic ﬁrms. Table 8 presents
our main results from IV estimations, while Table 7 presents the results from OLS estimation,
which are qualitatively similar, for comparison. The columns of Table 8 give coeﬃcient
estimates for private share, FDI presence, and the interaction term between private share
and FDI presence along with an F-test of total eﬀect of FDI on 100% private ﬁrms. The
rest of the columns report the ﬁt statistics and speciﬁcation tests. We can see that the null
of weak instruments is always rejected while the null of valid instruments is never rejected.
The top panel of Table 8 shows that private ﬁrms pay higher wages to both engineers and
managers where there is more FDI. In contrast, FDI presence has no eﬀect on the average
wages of production workers. The results also show that there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects of
FDI on the wages of skilled or unskilled labor in SOEs.
The bottom panel of Table 8 summarizes the eﬀects of FDI on average labor quality. For
unskilled labor such as production workers, FDI presence has no signiﬁcant eﬀects on either
their average age or their average education. In contrast, the presence of FDI reduces the
average quality of engineers, exhibited by their average education level, both in SOEs and
in private ﬁrms. For SOEs, the average education of managers also tends to decrease in the
presence of FDI; but such eﬀect is not present for private ﬁrms. There is also evidence that
the average age of engineers hired by SOEs increases in the presence of FDI, although these
20The remaining average diﬀerences reﬂect the fact that age, education, and foreign experience only
measure some of the quality aspects, with many others not observed by an econometrician.
21Note that average education of managers in SOEs is 12.6 years — see Table 5.
18last two eﬀect are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Two results on quality of managers are a bit diﬀerent from those on engineers. With higher
FDI presence, the average age of managers tends to decrease for private ﬁrms, while the
percentage of managers with foreign work experience tends to increase for these ﬁrms. In
other words, the average quality of managers for private ﬁrms tends to be higher where FDI
is present.
To understand the magnitudes of these eﬀects, we compare the eﬀects of an increase in
FDI presence from zero to 20 percent in the city–industry cell on fully private and fully
state–owned ﬁrms. Such an increase in FDI presence would lead to 60-70 percent increase
in wages of both engineers and managers in private ﬁrms, but not in SOEs. It would also
lower average education of engineers in SOEs and private ﬁrms by about 7 months, lower the
average age of managers in private ﬁrms by 5.7 years, and increase the share of managers
with foreign experience in private ﬁrms by 18 percentage points.
3.4 Robustness tests
The main concern with the data is that the measure of FDI presence is constructed using a
small sample of the ﬁrms. Thus, we are concerned that one large ﬁrm with or without foreign
presence will substantially aﬀect the average foreign share we calculate for the city–industry
cell. We therefore construct the alternative measure, for ﬁve manufacturing sectors only,
using the census of manufacturing ﬁrms. We are comforted to ﬁnd that the new measure
is very similar to our original one: for the manufacturing sectors the simple correlation
coeﬃcient between the two FDI measures is 0.54, the adjusted R2 of the regression of one
measure on the other and city and industry ﬁxed eﬀects is 0.84, and the Spearman rank
correlation coeﬃcient is 0.64.22
Since the new measure seems to be substantially higher than our original one for three sectors
22See Hale and Long (2007) for additional details and the tabulations of the alternative measure.
19in Guangzhou and one sector in Tianjin, to test whether our results are sensitive to the small
diﬀerences in the FDI measure, we replace our original measure with the new measure for
manufacturing sectors, while keeping the original measure for the service sectors.23 All our
results on labor quality hold both qualitatively and quantitatively. For the wage results,
the P-values tend to increase because the new measure of FDI presence has higher variance,
while qualitatively our results hold. We recover the statistical signiﬁcance of the results if
we use instead the log(1 + new measure) which better matches the mean and the variance
of our original measure.
We attempted alternative deﬁnitions of the FDI presence coming from our original data
set. First, we used the same measure of FDI presence as in main speciﬁcation, but for 2000
rather than for 1999. Our results are unchanged. Alternatively, we weighed the FDI share in
each ﬁrm by the number of years since the ﬁrm ﬁrst acquired a foreign partner, thus giving
higher weight to FDI that was around for longer. We found that such modiﬁcation does not
aﬀect our results much. We are thus fairly comfortable with the results reported in our main
speciﬁcation.
We also re-estimated wage regressions controlling for the hiring conditions of the ﬁrms,
speciﬁc to each type of labor, such as minimum age, education, and experience of new hires,
as well as the number of job applications per vacancy. While this restricts our sample, we
found that our results are robust to including such controls
Finally, because Barry, G¨ org, and Strobl (2005) show that FDI may have diﬀerential eﬀects
on wages of exporting and non–exporting ﬁrms, we reestimate our regressions controlling
for the share of foreign sales of each ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that our results are not aﬀected by the
inclusion of this additional control variable.
23We are unable to estimate the model for manufacturing sector only, because a small number of degrees
of freedom is left when the sample is cut by half.
204 Discussion of empirical ﬁndings
Our empirical ﬁndings give an aﬃrmative answer to the question stated in the title of this
paper — “Did Foreign Direct Investment Put an Upward Pressure on Wages in China?”
While this particular result is quite straightforward, we also ﬁnd some subtle and interesting
patterns in the way FDI aﬀects China’s labor markets. In particular, we ﬁnd that the upward
pressure of FDI on wages is limited to the market for skilled labor, and that while private
ﬁrms experience competition from foreign invested ﬁrms as evidenced by higher wages of
skilled workers, SOEs respond to such competition by hiring skilled workers of lower quality.
In this section we discuss our interpretations of this patterns.
Our ﬁnding that foreign ﬁrms pay higher average wages to skilled labor are consistent with
the view that better technology used by foreign ﬁrms is complementary to skill and makes
skilled labor more productive. In particular, we ﬁnd the results to be more pronounced
for managers than for engineers. This is consistent with the belief that foreign ﬁrms have
superior managerial practices and therefore their managers in particular are more produc-
tive. Another potential reason for this ﬁnding is that foreign ﬁrms seek more productive
managers and that age, education, and foreign experience do not fully account for diﬀer-
ences in managers’ productivity. In the latter case, more talented managers would be hired
away from domestic ﬁrms and we would observe a decline in quality of managers in domestic
ﬁrms where FDI presence increases, while the aggregate wage level would not increase. As
results in Table 8 demonstrate, we did not observe such an eﬀect, which suggests that FDI is
likely to lead directly to an increase in productivity and thus average wages of skilled labor,
especially managers.
Our ﬁndings with respect to the eﬀect of private ownership share on wages and quality of
labor in purely domestic ﬁrms are consistent with our discussion of hiring practices in China.
In particular, we ﬁnd that production workers are paid roughly the same in two types of
ﬁrms, while engineers and managers are paid more in private ﬁrms, indicating relatively
21more compressed wage structure in SOEs. As we discussed, this could be due to implicit
or explicit wage constraints faced by SOEs in competing with other types of ﬁrms or to
the inferiority of their skill–complementary factors of production. Our ﬁnding that SOEs
tend to employ lower quality skilled labor compared to private ﬁrms indicates that the wage
compression in SOEs is more likely due to implicit or explicit constraints on wages they can
pay.
Furthermore, the average quality of managers for private ﬁrms tends to be higher where
FDI is present. Since there is no robust evidence for deteriorating quality of managers
in SOEs, these results seem to suggest that the supply of managers is more elastic than
that for engineers. In particular, the inﬂow of FDI may have increased the pool of managers,
especially those with foreign work experience. But it is interesting that only private domestic
ﬁrms beneﬁt from the larger pool of managerial talent, but not SOEs. Our explanation for
the diﬀerence is again the wage restriction faced by SOEs.
In light of our above discussion of reasons for wage compression in SOEs and the cited reports
on skilled labor shortages in China, we believe our results can be summarized as follows.
Consider the impact of foreign ﬁrm entry on the labor market in the context of China, where
SOEs face explicit or implicit constraints on wages or have inferior technologies that render
skilled labor less productive. One potential eﬀect is an increased demand for skilled labor.
Since foreign ﬁrms are likely to use more skill–intensive technology and due to “greenﬁeld”
FDI that increase demand for all factors of production, larger foreign presence in the city
would lead to a higher demand for skilled labor. Given that in the short and medium run
the supply of skilled labor is very inelastic, this would push the wages of skilled workers up
in the city and industry with higher FDI presence. While private ﬁrms would have to raise
wages of their skilled workers in order to retain them, SOEs might ﬁnd it diﬃcult because of
explicit or implicit wage constraints. As a result, quality of skilled workers in SOEs would
decline.
22Of course, this is not the only story that is potentially consistent with our ﬁndings. For
example, if foreign ﬁrms bring superior skill–complementary technology and that superior
technology is adopted by domestic private ﬁrms but not by SOEs, we would observe similar
patterns. While we do not rule out this possibility, we believe that this scenario is less likely
because to our knowledge there is no convincing evidence of technological spillovers from
FDI in China. In particular, as we document in our related paper (Hale and Long, 2007), we
fail to ﬁnd any positive spillovers in this same data set. Moreover, our ﬁnding of a decline
in the quality of skilled labor in SOEs when more FDI is present is hard to explain within
this scenario.
Overall, our results suggest that skilled labor is scarce and unskilled labor is abundant in
China (or at least was abundant at the time the survey was conducted). As a result, higher
competition for skilled labor induced by foreign direct investment leads to higher wages of
skilled labor both in foreign invested and in domestic private ﬁrms that compete with foreign
invested ﬁrms for skilled labor. SOEs appear to be unable or unwilling to increase the wages
they pay to their skilled workers and as a result experience a decline in the quality of their
skilled personnel.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we found that the FDI presence in China is putting an upward pressure on
wages of skilled workers through increased competition in the market for skilled labor. Such
competition eﬀects are reﬂected in an increase in wages that private ﬁrms pay to their skilled
workers and in a decline in quality of skilled labor in SOEs that appear to be constrained in
terms of wages they can pay to their employees. We ﬁnd no such competition eﬀects in the
market for unskilled production workers.
These ﬁndings suggest that labor market institutions such as wage constraints have impor-
tant implications on how FDI aﬀects domestic ﬁrms. To the extent that many developing
23countries have rigid labor market conditions, our ﬁndings help explain why it is particularly
diﬃcult to ﬁnd positive FDI spillovers in these countries.
As an example, these ﬁndings oﬀer one reason for why Hale and Long (2007) and others fail
to ﬁnd positive productivity spillovers from FDI into China, at least for the SOEs. If FDI
leads to a lower quality of skilled workers in SOEs, these ﬁrms may lack the human capital
necessary for absorbing potential technological spillovers. This in turn implies that quicker
privatization may be necessary in order to capture potential positive spillovers from FDI.
Moreover, our ﬁndings have important implications for inequality in China. In particular,
because FDI presence increases wages of better paid skilled workers, but does not have
an eﬀect on wages of production workers, more FDI presence is likely to lead to higher
income inequality. This is, in fact, consistent with recent trends of a growing rural–urban
income inequality, because unskilled labor in China is largely drawn from the pool of rural
population.
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27Appendix. Variables used in this study
In this study, we use a small portion of the survey that gives information on ﬁrms’ input,
output, as well as foreign ownership. In particular, we use the following variables directly or
constructed from the survey, with all values referring to year 2000 unless indicated otherwise:
Capital input: Value of ﬁxed assets in year 2000 RMB, used in logs.
Labor input: Number of employees in the ﬁrm, used in logs.
Capital/Labor: Capital intensity of the ﬁrm, measured as the ratio between capital input
and labor input.
Firm age: Firm’s age.
Average education: Average education level of production workers, engineering, and man-
agerial personnel in the ﬁrm, in years of schooling.
Average age: Average age of production workers, engineering, and managerial personnel
in the ﬁrm, in years.
Average foreign experience: Average foreign experience of engineering and managerial
personnel in the ﬁrm, in years.
Transportation cost: Transportation expenses divided by sales.
Industry: Industry sector of the ﬁrm, a categorical variable 1,2,...,10.
City: City where the ﬁrm is located, a categorical variable 1,2,...,5.
Largest foreign partner: The share of the largest foreign partner in ﬁrm’s ownership in
1999.
Private ownership share: Total share of private ownership, including portfolio invest-
ment in 1999.
Foreign ownership share: Total share of foreign ownership, including portfolio invest-
ment in 1999.
Share of foreign sales: Foreign sales divided by total sales in 1999.
Transportation cost of supplies: Share of transportation cost in the total cost of supplies
purchased in 1999.
We use the following variables from outside of our survey data to construct instruments for
FDI presence:
Port berth: The total number of berths (including both productive and non-productive)
in the port located by the city (valued at 0 if the city has no port), obtained from
Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2001, National Bureau of Statistics.
Distance between cities: The distance between the capital city of each province or au-
tonomous region and the cities in our sample, obtained from the oﬃcial web site of the
China National Materials, Storage and Transportation Corporation.24
Provincial population: The population of each province or autonomous region, obtained
from Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2001, National Bureau of Statistics.
24http://www.cmst.com.cn/mileage/mileage.asp last accessed on January 29, 2007.
28Table 1: Distribution of Foreign and Domestic Firms
All Foreign Domestic Private sharea
Number of ﬁrms 1500 382 1118 1118
by city:
1. Beijing 300 75 225 0.31
2. Chengdu 300 32 268 0.39
3. Guangzhou 300 84 216 0.46
4. Shanghai 300 122 178 0.16
5. Tianjin 300 69 231 0.39
by industry:
1. Accounting etc. 104 11 93 0.41
2. Advertising and marketing 89 15 74 0.39
3. Apparel and leather 222 63 159 0.36
4. Business logistics services 110 22 88 0.14
5. Communication services 71 3 68 0.12
6. Consumer products 165 40 125 0.39
7. Electronic components 203 77 126 0.36
8. Electronic equipment 192 65 127 0.37
9. IT services 128 21 107 0.49
10. Vehicles and parts 216 65 151 0.37
a For domestic ﬁrms only
Table 2: FDI presence by city and industry sector in 1999
Sector, city Beijing Chengdu Guangzhou Shanghai Tianjin Overall
Accounting and related services 0.186 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.022 0.048
Advertising and marketing 0.036 0.008 0.013 0.095 0.193 0.074
Apparel and leather goods 0.162 0.009 0.212 0.174 0.311 0.172
Business logistics services 0.006 0.000 0.032 0.040 0.044 0.024
Communication services 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.003
Consumer products 0.097 0.061 0.108 0.185 0.324 0.161
Electronic components 0.149 0.038 0.207 0.302 0.458 0.231
Electronic equipment 0.253 0.014 0.065 0.353 0.240 0.189
Information technology services 0.052 0.068 0.020 0.154 0.009 0.054
Vehicles and vehicle parts 0.123 0.096 0.125 0.238 0.121 0.139
Overall 0.129 0.036 0.104 0.186 0.209 0.133
29Table 3: Summary statistics
Domestic
Variable Mean (SOE) Mean(private) Diﬀ. Foreign
Log of Wage (prod.worker) 2.07 2.01 0.06 2.37
Log of Wage (engineer) 2.52 2.70 -0.18** 3.09
Log of Wage (manager) 2.54 2.68 -0.14* 3.16
Age (prod. worker) 34.6 30.5 4.0*** 29.1
Age (engineer) 37.5 34.2 3.4*** 32.8
Age (manager) 39.2 35.9 3.3*** 35.1
Education (prod.worker) 9.84 9.56 0.28** 9.78
Education (engineer) 13.1 13.5 -0.32*** 13.6
Education (manager) 12.6 12.7 -0.19* 13.1
Engineers with foreign experience 0.004 0.11 -0.006** 0.020
Managers with foreign experience 0.030 0.064 -0.034*** 0.15
Skill ratio 0.31 0.36 -0.056*** 0.35
Wage spread 0.44 0.58 -0.14** 0.66
Firm age 23.7 9.92 13.8*** 8.30
Log of capital stock 9.63 8.21 1.42*** 10.0
Log of labor force 5.60 4.76 0.84*** 5.4
Observationsa 326 792 382
Note: SOE is deﬁned as private share< 1, private= not(SOE)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
a Due to missing values, the number of observations for each variable may be smaller
30Table 4: Diﬀerences between foreign and domestic private ﬁrms. OLS
Dependent var. β(foreign share) Robust S.e. Controls Adj.R2 N.(obs)
Wage
Log (average wage)
production workers 0.16 (0.12) Log(K/L) 0.06 791
engineers 0.29** (0.13) Log(K/L) 0.12 832
managers 0.50*** (0.11) Log(K/L) 0.15 1075
production workers 0.14 (0.13) Log(K/L), qualityb 0.06 776
engineers 0.24* (0.13) Log(K/L), qualityb 0.12 801
managers 0.36*** (0.12) Log(K/L), qualityb 0.16 1017
Labor quality
Avg. age
production workers -2.33*** (0.79) Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.33 782
engineers -2.32*** (0.76) Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.26 837
managers -1.63** (0.70) Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.22 1071
Avg. education
production workers 0.15 (0.19) Log(K) 0.21 782
engineers 0.11 (0.17) Log(K) 0.20 839
managers 0.73*** (0.15) Log(K) 0.28 1074
Avg. foreign experience
engineers 0.009 (0.007) Log(K) 0.12 815
managers 0.12*** (0.033) Log(K) 0.09 1027
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
b quality controls include average age, average age squared, and average education of the relevant group
as well as controls for foreign experience for engineers and managers
Estimated by OLS. City*sector ﬁxed eﬀects included in all regression
Sample limited to private ﬁrms
31Table 5: Diﬀerences between foreign and domestic private ﬁrms. IV
Dependent var. β(foreign share) Robust S.e. P-value (1)a P-value (2)b N.(obs)
Wage
Log (average wage)
production workers 0.72 (0.46) 0.00 0.18 778
engineers 1.12** (0.51) 0.00 0.84 820
managers 1.92*** (0.53) 0.00 0.79 1059
production workers 0.92 (0.56) 0.00 0.24 764
engineers 1.00** (0.49) 0.00 0.94 792
managers 1.71*** (0.63) 0.00 0.77 1004
Labor quality
Avg. age
production workers -23.5*** (6.70) 0.00 0.19 770
engineers -17.5** (6.22) 0.00 0.00 827
managers -21.2*** (5.55) 0.00 0.13 1055
Avg. education
production workers -2.42* (1.25) 0.00 0.27 770
engineers -1.85* (1.10) 0.00 0.33 829
managers 0.50 (0.79) 0.00 0.32 1058
Avg. foreign experience
engineers 0.05 (0.05) 0.00 0.05 806
managers 0.47*** (0.14) 0.00 0.52 1013
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
a Partial F-test for the ﬁrst stage (H0: weak instruments)
b Hansen J-test for over-identiﬁcation (H0: valid instruments)
Estimated by OLS. City*sector ﬁxed eﬀects included in all regression
Sample limited to private ﬁrms. Control variables are the same as in Table 4
32Table 6: Diﬀerences between domestic private ﬁrms and SOEs
Dependent var. β(private share) Robust S.e. Controls Adj.R2 N.(obs)
Wage
Log (avg. wage)
production workers 0.012 (0.093) Log(K/L) 0.07 793
engineers 0.17** (0.080) Log(K/L) 0.13 828
managers 0.18*** (0.070) Log(K/L) 0.14 1076
production workers 0.022 (0.10) Log(K/L), qualityb 0.07 778
engineers 0.10 (0.081) Log(K/L), qualityb 0.13 790
managers 0.13* (0.074) Log(K/L), qualityb 0.15 1013
Labor quality
Avg. age
production workers -5.00*** (0.59) Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.38 784
engineers -2.33*** (0.61) Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.27 830
managers -3.90*** (0.48) Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.27 1075
Avg. education
production workers -0.28** (0.13) Log(K) 0.21 789
engineers 0.042 (0.12) Log(K) 0.18 831
managers 0.29** (0.11) Log(K) 0.25 1077
Avg. foreign experience
engineers 0.012** (0.005) Log(K) 0.18 820
managers 0.073*** (0.013) Log(K) 0.11 1050
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
b quality controls include avg. age, avg. age squared, and avg. education of the relevant group
as well as controls for foreign experience for engineers and managers
Estimated by OLS. City*sector ﬁxed eﬀects included in all regression
Sample limited to domestically owned ﬁrms
33Table 7: Eﬀect of FDI on domestic private ﬁrms and SOEs. OLS
Coeﬃcient on
Dependent var. Private shr. FDI FDI*Prv.shr. Controls Adj.R2 N.(obs)
Wage
Log (average wage)
production workers -0.079 0.60 0.20 Log(K/L) 0.06 793
engineers 0.057 1.17* 0.69 Log(K/L) 0.11 828
managers -0.016 0.46 1.35** Log(K/L) 0.12 1076
production workers -0.075 0.58 0.25 Log(K/L), qualityb 0.06 778
engineers 0.008 1.33* 0.50 Log(K/L), qualityb 0.11 790
managers -0.11 0.47 1.76*** Log(K), qualityb 0.13 1013
Labor quality
Avg. age
production workers -4.89*** 3.31 -3.62 Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.38 784
engineers -2.62** 3.22 0.56 Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.27 830
managers -3.21*** 1.40 -7.96 Log(K), ﬁrm age 0.27 1075
Avg. education
production workers -0.47* -0.023 0.56 Log(K) 0.20 789
engineers -0.066 -0.324 0.83 Log(K) 0.17 831
managers 0.046 -0.896 1.95* Log(K) 0.24 1077
Avg. foreign experience
engineers 0.003 -0.027 0.036 Log(K) 0.001 820
managers 0.049** -0.001 0.30** Log(K) 0.08 1050
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. S.e. are clustered on city*sector cells
b quality controls include avg. age, avg. age squared, and avg. education of the relevant group
as well as controls for foreign experience for engineers and managers
Estimated by OLS. City ﬁxed eﬀects and sector ﬁxed eﬀects included in all regression
Sample limited to domestically owned ﬁrms
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